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liberalization, permitted by Article XXIV of the GATT, on countrys incentives to
participate in multilateral negotiations and on the feasibility of the global free trade.
We present a model in which countries choose whether to participate in preferen-
tial or multilateral trade agreements under political pressures from domestic special
interest groups. We show that heterogeneity in political preferences across coun-
tries plays an important role for the relative merits of preferential and multilateral
approaches to trade liberalization. On one hand, the opportunity to liberalize pref-
erentially may be necessary to induce countries with strong political motivations
to participate in multilateral free trade negotiations. On the other hand, when
countries share similar political preferences, multilateral free trade that would have
been politically supported otherwise becomes unattainable if countries can pursue
preferential liberalization.
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1 Introduction
Since the establishment of the General Agreement on Tari¤s and Trade (GATT), trade
reforms have proceeded along three main fronts: unilaterally, preferentially with a few
partners, and multilaterally within the GATT, now subsumed by the World Trade
Organization (WTO). Of the three approaches, preferential trade liberalization gained
the most popularity in recent years, with the number of preferential trade agreements
(PTAs) increased four-fold since completion of the Uruguay round of WTO negotiations
in 1994.1 In contrast, the last round of the multilateral trade talks the Doha Round 
have failed to come to a fruitful conclusion despite thirteen years of intense negotiations.
Although PTAs are sanctioned by the Article XXIV of the GATT in order to promote
freer trade, they come into direct conict with the main GATT/WTO principles of
reciprocity and non-discrimination. As such, there are concerns that the spread of
PTAs may hurt the multilateral trading system and serve as an alternative, rather than
a complement, to multilateral trade liberalization.2
Diverse interests of the WTO members are often blamed for the decline in multilat-
eralism and proliferation of PTAs. In particular, di¤erences in political idiosyncrasies
and protectionist preferences across countries may induce similar countries to ne-
gotiate PTAs rather than participate in large scale multilateral deals. Therefore, the
political economy factors may play an important role in the analysis of PTAs, and our
goal in this paper is to study how heterogeneity in political preferences across countries
a¤ects the global trade system. We devise a model of endogenous formation of trade
agreements both bilateral and multilateral with politically motivated governments in
order to analyze whether or not the freedom to pursue Free Trade Agreements (FTAs),
permitted by Article XXIV, is necessary to attain global free trade.3 We nd that while
the ability to form FTAs reduces the likelihood of global free trade when countries have
symmetric political preferences, with asymmetric preferences the global free trade may
become politically feasible only when countries have the freedom to pursue FTAs. These
results suggest that, in order to assess the e¤ect of Article XXIV on the prospect of
global free trade, political asymmetries across countries must be taken into account in
the analysis of trade agreement formation.
The debate about the e¤ect of PTAs on the trade system centers around the terms
1As of 15 June 2014, 585 notications of PTAs (counting goods and services separately) had been
received by the World Trade Organization (WTO). Of these notications, 379 PTAs are already in force
with others scheduled for implementation in the near future.
2While the most favored nation (MFN) clause requires the WTO member countries to undertake
trade liberalization on a non-discriminatory basis, Article XXIV of the GATT permits a group of
countries to pursue PTAs under which they can grant tari¤ (and other trade policy) concessions to each
other that they do not have to extend to other WTO members.
3We do not consider unilateral trade liberalization since all countries have unilateral incentive to
extract rent and such liberalization is not in any countrys interest.
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building and stumbling blocs, introduced by Bhagwati (1991). The standard view in the
existing literature is that PTAs are building (stumbling) blocks to global free trade if
the process of bilateral trade liberalization eventually converges (fails to converge) to
global free trade.4 However, this view can be misleading if global free trade obtains
regardless of whether the formation of PTAs is allowed or not. In this paper, we take
an alternative view that PTAs are building blocks to global free trade when bilateral
trade agreements lay the foundation for multilateral free trade in the sense that the
freedom to pursue PTAs is necessary in order for global free trade to be achieved.5 Our
approach to trade agreement formation follows that of Saggi and Yildiz (2010) under
which both preferential and MFN-based multilateral agreements emerge endogenously.
Using this approach in a political economy context, we take the building vs. stumbling
blocs debate one step further. Specically, we show that under certain conditions, the
freedom to pursue FTAs (Article XXIV) is necessary to attain global free trade. In such
a case, FTAs act as a strong building bloc. We also nd that there are conditions under
which the freedom to pursue FTAs prevents the attainment of global free trade that
would arise when countries were to follow trade liberalization on an MFN basis only.
When that happens, FTAs act as a strong stumbling bloc. To the best of our knowledge,
this paper is the rst attempt to address the role of politics in a model where the
formation of trade agreements (both preferential and multilateral) is endogenous.
Our theoretical framework is based on a three-country model of trade with oligopolis-
tic markets where countries optimally choose tari¤ rates and membership in trade agree-
ments.6 As in Grossman and Helpman (1995), policymakers in all countries are polit-
ically biased and balance social welfare with industrial interests. Our analysis draws
on a comparison of equilibrium outcomes under bilateralism, where countries have a
freedom to form FTAs, and multilateralism, where FTAs are not available. To this end,
we employ a three stage game under both bilateralism and multilateralism. In the rst
stage of each game, equilibrium trade agreements are formed between countries. In the
second stage countries choose import tari¤s under a given trade policy regime, and in the
4Earlier literature on the building versus stumbling bloc discussion has taken trade agreements exoge-
nously and focused on the incentives of countries to participate in multilateral free trade (see Grossman
and Helpman, 1995; Krishna, 1998; Ornelas, 2005a,b). More recent studies, including Goyal and Joshi
(2006), Aghion et al. (2007), Furusawa and Konishi (2007), and Seidman (2009) use endogenous for-
mation of PTAs but ignore the possibility of trade liberalization on an MFN basis, and view PTAs as
building blocs so long as their pursuit eventually leads to global free trade.
5Similarly, we argue that PTAs are stumbling blocs if the freedom to pursue bilateral FTAs hampers
multilateral free trade that would have been obtained if countries were to pursue trade liberalization
only multilaterally.
6Using the same market structure, Krishna (1998) demonstrates that, for exogenously given tari¤s,
formation of an FTA between two countries reduces their incentives to liberalize trade with respect
to the third country. With endogenous tari¤s, Ornelas (2005a,b) shows that an FTA induces member
countries to lower their tari¤s on the non-member country. In contrast to our paper, Krishna (1998)
and Ornelas (2005a,b) do not develop an equilibrium theory of FTAs and only consider the e¤ects of
an exogenously given FTA.
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third stage rms compete in a Cournot fashion. For the equilibrium analysis, we utilize
the concept of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) and focus on Nash agreements
that are immune to self-enforcing coalitional deviations. This renement of Nash equi-
librium is important in order to capture the negotiations of trade agreements in a more
realistic fashion. Consistent with the denition of CPNE in Bernheim et al. (1987), all
countries are free to arrange mutually benecial deviations from Nash agreements and
an initial coalitional deviation from a Nash equilibrium must be self-enforcing, i.e. tak-
ing the strategy of the complement as xed, no proper subset of the deviating coalition
has an incentive for further deviation.7 By comparing the sets of CPNE agreements
under bilateralism and multilateralism, we identify the consequences of the exception
to non-discrimination principle incorporated in the GATT Article XXIV.
The model generates new insights into the optimal tari¤ formation under both prefer-
ential and two-country multilateral agreements (MA) with political biases. As a starting
point, our optimal tari¤ discussion under a bilateral FTA conrms the ndings by Or-
nelas (2005a,b) about the e¤ect of political economy forces on trade policy: while the
optimal tari¤s rise with the governments political bias under all trade regimes, an FTA
induces each member to reduce external tari¤s against non-members and the reduction
is deeper for more politically motivated governments. We complement Ornelasresults
by showing that the same result obtains under a MA. This nding captures the free-
riding problem inherent to multilateral trade liberalization which does not involve all
countries since the non-participating country benets from the multilateral trade liberal-
ization undertaken by the other two countries without having to o¤er any liberalization
in return. More importantly, the comparison of external tari¤s of member countries
under an FTA and an MA reveals that the degree of trade liberalization undertaken
by member countries is lower when they sign a multilateral agreement relative to the
one when they sign a preferential agreement. This gap between external tari¤s widens
as the member countries become more politically motivated. This gap determines the
payo¤ of the non-member country under these two alternative trade agreements and
hence the countrys incentives to participate in one or the other.
The relative e¤ect of an FTA and an MA between a pair of countries on a third
7 In examining endogenous formation of PTAs, Goyal and Joshi (2006) and Furusawa and Konishi
(2007) employ the concept of pairwise stability in a network formation game developed by Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996). Unlike CPNE, the concept of pairwise stability implies two constraints. First, the
deviating coalition can contain at most two countries. Second, the deviation can consist of severing just
one existing link or forming one additional link. Unlike the present paper, they only examine whether
the formation of FTAs results in a global free trade as the stable outcome and do not analyze the
consequences of adopting a multilateral approach to trade liberalization. Like us, Riezman (1999) also
asks whether bilateralism facilitates or hinders the achievement of global free trade. However, while
we analytically derive CPNE agreements, Riezman (1999) uses the cooperative solution concept of the
core and illustrates his results via numerical examples. Saggi and Yildiz (2010) and Saggi et al. (2013)
use the CPNE equilibrium concept but do not analyze the role of political economy factors in trade
agreement formaion.
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country is determined by two opposing forces. First, there is a tari¤ level e¤ect which
makes the outside country better o¤ under the FTA because preferential agreements
result in lower tari¤s for non-members relative to MA. Second, there is a discrimination
e¤ect that exists only under a bilateral FTA and lowers the outside countrys payo¤.
The discrimination e¤ect stems from the fact that the FTA tari¤s only apply to a non-
member country which thus is subject to a discriminatory treatment in each member
countrys market under a bilateral FTA. The combination of these two e¤ects yields that
the payo¤ of the non-member countrys government is lower under an FTA than under
an MA when the political biases of the member countries are su¢ ciently low. Intuitively,
as the political biases of member countries rise, the tari¤ complementarity deepens and
the tari¤ level e¤ect becomes stronger, while the discrimination e¤ect weakens. This
fundamental di¤erence between bilateral and multilateral trade liberalization plays a
crucial role in our analysis of equilibrium trade agreements that we examine next.
In analyzing equilibrium trade agreements, we start with symmetric political pref-
erences and nd that the equilibrium outcome is determined by the strength of the
political bias. First, when governments have su¢ ciently strong political biases, free
trade fails to be a CPNE under both bilateralism and multilateralism. This nding
contrasts with most of the previous literature on endogenous trade agreements with-
out political economy factors. For example, in a model with symmetric countries and
welfare-maximizing governments, Saggi and Yildiz (2010) argue that free trade obtains
as a unique CPNE regardless of the trade regime in place. Second, when the degree of
political motivation is su¢ ciently low, free trade is a unique CPNE under both trade
regimes. This result converges to the main nding by Goyal and Joshi (2006), who an-
alyze endogenous formation of trade agreements in the oligopoly model of trade where
countries pursue PTAs only and governments have no political biases. While they in-
terpret this result as compatibility of bilateralism and free trade, we show that it may
break down if governments have political motivations. Third, when the political biases
are at the intermediate range, the ability to form FTAs reduces the likelihood of global
free trade arising as a CPNE. As discussed above, when such is the case, FTAs act as
a strong stumbling bloc for multilateral free trade. Over this range of political bias pa-
rameter, the tari¤ level e¤ect dominates the discrimination e¤ect and each country has
an incentive to free ride on the bilateral trade liberalization by the other two countries,
while such an incentive does not exist under multilateralism. Finally, when global free
trade is out of reach under both bilateralism and multilateralism, we nd that the abil-
ity to form bilateral FTAs can either improve (partial building bloc) or reduce (partial
stumbling bloc) global welfare, depending on the degree of political motivation.8
8Partial building bloc result stems from the fact that trade liberalization is deeper under an FTA
relative to MA and thus the former yields higher global welfare. When political biases are su¢ ciently
strong, no agreementarises under bilateralism while an MA obtains under multilateralism. When such
5
Next, we examine the scenario where countries have asymmetric political prefer-
ences. Empirical tests of the Grossman and Helpman (1994)s protection for sale model
consistently report substantial heterogeneity in political preferences across countries.9
In a recent study, Gawande et al. (2009) estimate the weight that governments attach
to social welfare relative to industry lobbying for a large number of countries in a uni-
ed theoretical and empirical framework. They report large variation in political biases
across countries, with the third quartile of the political bias parameter distribution being
seven-fold greater than the rst quartile. Furthermore, Krugman (1991) and Grossman
and Helpman (1995) noted that asymmetries across countries can play a crucial role in
determining incentives for preferential and multilateral trade liberalization. Yet the ex-
isting literature on trade agreements has tended to pay little attention to cross-country
heterogeneity in political preferences.10 We introduce this heterogeneity in our model
by assuming that one country has stronger political bias than the other two (symmetric)
countries. Our results show that heterogeneity across countries may be an important
determinant of the success of multilateralism and that bilateralism may facilitate the
process of global trade liberalization.
Under asymmetric political preferences, both the degree of political biases and the
heterogeneity in political preferences determine the equilibrium outcomes under both
bilateralism and multilateralism. Consistent with this, whether global free trade is a
CPNE or not depends critically on the unilateral deviation incentive of the country with
the strongest political bias. When governmentspolitical biases are su¢ ciently weak and
the degree of asymmetry in political preferences are su¢ ciently small, free trade obtains
under both games and thus the freedom to pursue bilateral FTAs is irrelevant for the
ultimate objective of achieving global free trade. More interestingly, we show that un-
like the symmetric case, the freedom to pursue FTAs can be necessary for achieving
global free trade when the asymmetry in political preferences is su¢ ciently large and
the political biases of countries are not very strong. Under such a case, the country with
the strongest political preference has incentive to unilaterally deviate from free trade
under multilateralism but not under bilateralism since the discrimination e¤ect domi-
nates the tari¤ level e¤ect. Thus, the threat of a bilateral FTA between two countries
and the discrimination that is inherent to such trade agreement can be necessary to
convince the country with the strongest political preference to announce in favor of the
global free trade. When such is the case, Article XXIV acts as a strong building bloc for
is the case, we argue that partial trade liberalization is better than none and thus partial stumbling
blocs result obtains.
9See Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) for the U.S., Mitra et al. (2002) for Turkey, Cadot et al.
(2003) for India, McCalman (2004) for Australia, Stoyanov (2009) for Canada.
10Furusawa and Konishi (2007) consider asymmetry in the size of the industrial good industry and the
market size. In Saggi and Yildiz (2010) the underlying asymmetry is in the endowment levels. Political
economy factors play no role in these papers.
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achieving the global free trade. However, when governments are relatively symmetric
in their political biases which are moderately strong (or as we converge to the complete
symmetry), the tari¤ level e¤ect dominates the discrimination e¤ect and the incentives
for participating in global free trade are stronger when discriminatory bilateral agree-
ments are not permitted. In this case, bilateral FTAs act as a strong stumbling bloc
for the global free trade. Finally, when global free trade is out of reach under both
bilateralism and multilateralism and bilateral FTAs and MAs are CPNE, the option to
pursue bilateral FTAs can yield a welfare-improving trade liberalization that is foregone
under a strictly multilateral approach and thus bilateral FTAs act as a partial building
bloc.11
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the underlying trade model with
political economy discussion. Sections 3 and 4 present the equilibrium analysis under
bilateralism and multilateralism with symmetric political preferences. Section 5 ex-
tends the equilibrium analyses under these two regimes to the case with asymmetric
political preferences across countries and then Section 6 concludes. Proofs are collected
in Appendix A. The implications of alternative pattern of asymmetry are discussed in
Appendix B.
2 Model
We develop a simple oligopoly model of trade in which each country has a unilateral
incentive to impose a rent-extracting tari¤ on those trade partners with whom it does
not have any trade agreement. There are three countries in the model, i; j; k  a; b; c;
two sectors, producing goods y and x, and a single factor of production (labor, L).
Good y is a numéraire produced in every country by perfectly competitive rms under
constant return to scale production technology with labor productivity normalized to
one. The numéraire good is freely traded so that wages are equal to unity in all countries
and total income is equal to the labor supply.12 Good x is produced in each country by
a single prot-maximizing rm at a constant marginal cost in terms of the numeraire
good y. Production technologies are identical across countries. Therefore, international
trade results only from the oligopolistic behavior in sector x.13
A representative consumer in each country maximizes a quasilinear utility given by
U(xi; yi) = u(xi) + yi (1)
11As the degree of asymmetry falls and political biases are strong, FTAs can become a partial stum-
bling bloc, converging to the symmetric case.
12The numéraire good is freely traded across countries to settle the balance of trade.
13The gains from trade in this model stem from reduced market power in the domestic industry. To
this end, the monopoly assumption is not crucial but is the simplest way to model market power.
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where xi 
P
z=i;j;k
xzi is the total consumption of good x in country i and xzi is country
is consumption of x produced in country z. We also assume that the non-linear part
of the utility function is quadratic in x:
u(xi) = xi   x
2
i
2
It follows that the inverse demand function in country i is given by:
pi(xi) =   xi (2)
where  represents the market size of each country.14
In the absence of any trade agreement, rm j faces a specic tari¤ tji when exporting
to country i, with tii = 0 for all i. Denote the vector of tari¤ schedules of country i
by ti  (tij ; tik). Since tari¤ discrimination is prohibited by Article I of the GATT, we
restrict attention to the case where tij = tik = ti for all i; j; k when there is no FTA in
place. These trade barriers provide a cost advantage to domestic rms in local markets
by increasing the e¤ective unit cost serving the market for foreign rms:
czi = c+ tiz (3)
Then the prot function of rm z from sales in country i can be written as:
zi = xzipi(xi)  czixzi (4)
The rst-order conditions for prot maximization yield equilibrium output levels:
xii =
  3c+ P
z 6=i
czi
4
and xji =
+ c  3cji + cki
4
, z 6= i (5)
Equilibrium price in country i is easily calculated from the demand function:
pi =
+ ci +
P
z 6=i
czi
4
(6)
Using (5) and (6), equilibrium prots are:
ii = x
2
ii and zi = x
2
zi, z 6= i (7)
Import tari¤s protect the import-competing rms and raise their domestic prots at
14We abstract from asymmetries in country sizes and technologies in order to focus on the implications
of heterogeneity in political preferences across countries for the equilibrium trade policy.
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expense of foreign rms, so the following comparative statics results apply:
@ji
@tji
=  3xji
2
< 0;
@ii
@tij
=
xii
2
> 0; and
@ki
@tji
=
xki
2
> 0: (8)
Let country is national welfare function, denoted byWi, consist of consumer surplus,
producer surplus, and tari¤ revenue:
Wi = u(xi)  xipi(xi) + i +
X
z 6=i
tizxzi (9)
where producer surplus (i) is the sum of domestic rms prots in the local market
(denoted by ii) and the foreign markets, denoted by
P
z 6=i
iz: i = ii +
P
z 6=i
iz. It is
useful to dene domestic surplus (denoted byDSi) as the di¤erence between the national
welfare and export prots: DSi =Wi 
P
z 6=i
iz. Note that due to market segmentation,
strategic independence of trade policies obtains and thus DSi is fully determined by the
own tari¤ ti, while export prots depend on foreign tari¤s only.
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994), we dene governments preferences as
the weighted sum of national welfare and political contributions received from domestic
lobby groups (Ci): each government values a dollar received as contributions potentially
more than a dollar added to national welfare. Let i to be the degree of a governments
political bias, measured by the extent of governments preference for contributions vis-
a-vis national welfare. Thus, the governments payo¤ function can be expressed as:
gi(ti; Ci) =Wi(ti) + iCi
We assume that each oligopolistic rm is politically active and can provide its own
government with political contributions. Given contributions Ci, each rms in the
oligopolistic market maximizes its net payo¤ given by the di¤erence between its total
prots across all markets and the contributions it provides to the local government:15
 i(ti; Ci) = i(ti)  Ci
We follow Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998) and Ornelas (2005a,b) and model the
lobbying process as a simple Nash-bargaining game between the local rm and the
government.16 The equilibrium in this bargaining process obtains for the tari¤ that
15Similar to Grossman and Helpman (1995), we assume that lobbying takes place in each country
independently. Firm in each country lobby the national government and it is not possible to lobby
internationally. For detailed discussion of the bargaining process and equilibrium conditions, see Ornelas
(2005b,c).
16Baldwin (1987) argues that this formulation is consistent with the reduced form of many distinct
ways (including the protection for salemodel by Grossman and Helpman, 1994) to incorporate general
political and distributional concerns in the governmentsobjectives.
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maximizes the sum of governments and rms objective functions, or equivalently for
the tari¤ which solves the following problem:
max
ti
gi(ti)  DSi+iii +
X
z=j;k
iz
Under no trade agreement, governments choose tari¤s in anticipation of the rms
contributions, which in turn depend on the chosen tari¤ levels. When a bilateral FTA
is formed, tari¤s between member countries are set to zero and the rm bargains with
the local government over the external tari¤ on the non-member country. Under a
multilateral free trade all tari¤s are eliminated and there is no further policy to be
enacted. Thus, lobbying does not take place (i = 0), leading to the equivalence of the
governments payo¤ and national welfare.
3 Endogenous agreements under bilateralism
We now describe our three stage game of trade liberalization, which we refer to as
bilateralism, when governments have an option to form bilateral FTAs. In the rst stage,
each country simultaneously announces whether or not it wants to sign an FTA with
each of its trading partners. It is important to emphasize that in this game countries
do not announce in favor of a specic trade agreement but rather name partners with
whom they wants to form trade agreements. Country is announcement regarding its
preferred trade regime with countries j and k is denoted by i and its strategy set 
i
consists of four possible announcements:

i = ff; g; fj; g; f; kg; fj; kgg
where the announcement f; g is in favor of the status quo (no FTA with either trading
partner), fj; g in favor of an FTA with only country j; f; kg in favor of an FTA only
with country k; and fj; kg in favor of FTAs with both trading partners. The above
rst stage determines the underlying trade policy regime. Given the policy regime,
governments impose their optimal external tari¤s in the second stage. Finally, for a given
policy regime and import tari¤s, rms compete in the product markets in a Cournot
fashion. Since markets are segmented, rms make independent decisions regarding their
sales in each market (as in Brander and Krugman, 1983).
The following policy regimes can emerge in the bilateralism game: (i) no agreement
or the status quo, hi, would prevail if no two announcements match or when everyone
announces f; g; (ii) an FTA between countries i and j, denoted by hiji, would form
if and only if i and j announce in favor of FTA with each other and there is no other
matching announcement: i.e., i 2 j and j 2 i while i =2 k and/or k =2 i and j =2 k
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and/or k =2 j ; (iii) two independent FTAs (i.e. a hub and spoke trade regime) in which
i is the common member, denoted by hihi, are formed if and only if country i announces
in favor of signing an FTA with countries j and k while countries j and k announce
only in favor of FTA with country i: i.e. j 2 i and i 2 j and k 2 i and i 2 k while
k =2 j and/or j =2 k and (iv) free trade, denoted by hF i, would obtain if and only if
all countries announce each othersnames.17
In what follows, we rst derive the set of Nash equilibria and then allow coun-
tries to undertake coalitional deviations in order to isolate the set of coalition-proof
Nash equilibria (CPNE). Bernheim et. al. (1987) state that in an important class of
"noncooperative" environments, it is natural to assume that players can freely discuss
their strategies, but cannot make binding commitments. In such cases, any meaningful
agreement between the players must be self-enforcing. Although the Nash best-response
property is a necessary condition for self-enforceability, it is not su¢ cient it is in gen-
eral possible for coalitions to arrange plausible, mutually benecial deviations from Nash
agreements.The application of the CPNE solution concept is eminently desirable in
the present context since countries considering bilateral trade agreements certainly have
the capacity to communicate with one another without necessarily having the ability
to make binding commitments regarding their future plans with respect to such trade
agreements.
Before deriving equilibrium trade agreements, we clarify an expositional point: while
changes in the underlying trade regime result from announcement deviations by gov-
ernments, it proves more convenient to refer directly to regime changes rather than
changes in announcements. For example, when the bilateral FTA hiji is in place, the
unilateral announcement deviation of government i from fj; g to f; g alters the un-
derlying trade regime from hiji to no agreement hi, and we refer to this announcement
deviation of government i as simply a deviation from hiji to hi.
Let government is payo¤as a function of trade regime r be denoted by gi(r), where r
 fhi ; hiji ; hiki ; hjki ; hihi ; hjhi ; hkhi ; hF ig. Also, let gi(r  v) denote the di¤erence
between government is payo¤ under trade regimes r and v:
gi(r   v)  gi(r)  gi(v) (10)
We next consider the tari¤ determination under the bilateralism game.
17Note that the FTA hiji obtains so long as country i and j call only each other, regardless of the
nature of country ks announcement. Thus, if i = fj; g and j = fi; g, then country k would be
indi¤erent between k = f; g, fi; g, f; jg and fi; jg because its announcement has no bearing upon
the outcome. In this case, we assume that country k makes the most parsimonious announcement
among the three, k = f; g. The intuitive justication for this assumption is that an FTA proposal
is likely to be costly in the real world and a country that receives no proposals from others would be
better o¤ not making any proposals of its own.
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3.1 Optimal tari¤s
Since Article I of GATT forbids tari¤ discrimination, we assume that under No Agree-
ment hi, each country imposes a non-discriminatory tari¤ on its trading partners:
tij = tik = ti().18 If country i is not part of any FTA, its optimal MFN tari¤ is
calculated as
ti()  argmax gi() = (2i + 3)(  c)
2(5  2i)
(11)
As expected, governments that are inuenced heavily by special interest groups rely
on more protectionist trade policies: @ti()@i > 0. Note that for large values of i a
prohibitive tari¤ obtains:
xji() =
(2i   1)(  c)
2(5  2i)
< 0 when i >
1
2
In order to exclude prohibitive tari¤s and guarantee market access for all exporting
rms, we assume i  12 holds for all i.19
If two countries form an FTA, they remove their tari¤s on each other and impose
optimal external tari¤s on a non-member country: under hiji we have tij = tji = 0,
tki = ti(ij) and tkj = tj(ij). The optimal external tari¤ of country i on the non-member
country k is given by:
ti(ij)  argmax gi(ij) = (2i + 3)(  c)
21  2i
(12)
Similar to ti(), the optimal external tari¤ under an FTA is increasing in the degree
of political bias: @ti(ij)@i > 0. However, via reducing the markup for the domestic rm
due to higher competition, an FTA reduces the e¤ectiveness of the external tari¤ in
extracting rents from the outside rms. Thus, the formation of a bilateral FTA induces
each member to lower its tari¤ on the non-member country relative to the No Agreement
hi and the model exhibits the tari¤ complementarity:20
ti()  ti(ij) = (2i + 11)(2i + 3)(  c)
2(21  2i)(5  2i)
> 0
Furthermore, the tari¤ complementarity e¤ect deepens as the country becomes more
politically motivated:21
18Note that, under no agreement, cost symmetry across rms implies that non-discrimination arises
as an equilibrium policy in the model.
19This guarantees positive output levels of non-numeraire good under all possible agreements.
20See Bagwell and Staiger (1997) for a detailed discussion of the tari¤ complementarity e¤ect and
Estevadeordal et. al (2007) for empirical evidence in its support. It is worth noting that tari¤ comple-
mentarity also arises in simple general equilibrium models of free trade agreements such as Bond et. al
(2004).
21See Ornelas (2005b) for a detailed discussion.
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@[ti()  ti(ij)]
@i
> 0
3.2 Equilibrium analysis under symmetry
In this section we derive equilibrium trade policy under symmetry in political prefer-
ences. Therefore, throughout this section, as well as in Section 4, we maintain that
countries share the same political bias parameter: i =  for all i.
22
3.2.1 Nash equilibria
Four trade policy regimes can potentially appear in the equilibrium No Agreement hi,
a single bilateral FTA hiji, a hub and spoke agreement hihi, and a global free trade hF i.
It is straightforward to show that the announcements leading to No Agreement is a Nash
equilibrium since no country has an incentive to announce anothers name if the latter
does not announce its name in return. Before we discuss which other announcement
proles can emerge as Nash equilibria, let (r   v)i denote the critical threshold of the
degree of political bias parameter at which government i is indi¤erent between regimes
r and v.
Lemma 1: Under symmetry, the following holds for all i; j; k = a; b; c:
(i) gi(ih) > maxfgi(F ), gi(jh), gi(ij), gi(jk), gi()g while gk(ih  ij) < 0;
(ii) gi(ij   ) = gj(ij   )  0 i¤   (ij   )i;
(iii) gj(F   ih) = gk(F   ih)  0 i¤   (F   ih)j and
(iv) gi(F   jk)  0 i¤   (F   jk)i.
Lemma 1(i) implies that, in comparison to all other trade regimes, country i obtains
the highest welfare as being the hub under the hub and spoke agreement hihi. It also
states that each spoke country (say country k) has an incentive to unilaterally change
its announcement that leads to a break up its FTA with the hub and deviate from hihi
to hiji. This immediately implies that the announcement prole leading to a hub and
spoke arrangement hihi is not a Nash equilibrium.
Turning to the announcement prole leading to a bilateral FTA hiji, it is immediate
from Lemma 1(ii) that a member country of a bilateral FTA has a unilateral incentive to
change its announcement and break the agreement when its political bias is su¢ ciently
strong:  > (ij )i. This implies that the announcement prole leading to a bilateral
FTA is a Nash equilibrium when   (ij )i holds. It is also worth noting here that
the tari¤ complementarity e¤ect is large enough to make a non-member country always
better o¤ under a bilateral FTA relative to the status quo:
gk(ij   ) > 0 for all  (13)
22Calculations supporting the results are reported in Appendix A.
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The only remaining candidate for a Nash equilibrium is free trade hF i. For the
announcement prole leading to hF i to be a Nash equilibrium, we need to rule out
the following two announcement deviations of country k: (1) unilateral deviation from
announcement of fi; jg to fi; g that leads to a deviation from hF i to hihi and (2)
unilateral deviation from announcement of fi; jg to f; g that leads to a deviation from
hF i to hiji. We know from part (i) of Lemma 1 that a hub country is always better o¤
under the hub and spoke agreement relative to free trade. Part (iii) of Lemma 1 implies
that a country (say k) has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from fi; jg to fi; g when
the degree of political motivation is su¢ ciently high. We also know from part (iv) of
Lemma 1 that a country prefers free riding on bilateral trade liberalization undertaken
by others without liberalizing itself when it has strong political bias.
A comparison of the two critical values for the political bias parameter in parts (iii)
and (iv) of Lemma 1 reveals that (F   jk)i < (F   ih)j . Thus, the announcement
prole leading to hF i is a Nash equilibrium only when   (F   jk)i holds. The
above discussion yields that we have multiple Nash equilibria depending on the values
of . To deal with the multiplicity of equilibria described above and to capture the
process of FTA formation in a more realistic fashion, we now isolate coalition proof
Nash equilibria (CPNE), i.e. the Nash equilibria that are immune to self-enforcing
coalitional deviations.23
In order to verify if free trade hF i is a CPNE, where i = fj; kg, j = fi; kg, and
k = fi; jg, we need to rule out two distinct joint deviations:
(J1) joint deviation of countries i and j to a pair of announcements where they
only name each other with the intention of exuding the third country and forming an
FTA: country i changes its announcement from fj; kg to fj; g and country j changes
its announcement from fi; kg to fi; g while country ks announcement stays xed at
fi; jg;
(J2) joint deviation of two or all three countries to announcements that lead to a
deviation from hF i to hi.
First note that when countries i and j have su¢ ciently high political motivation,
they have an incentive to exclude country k and (J1) occurs:
gi(F   ij) = gj(F   ij)  0 i¤   (F   ij)i (14)
However, note from Lemma 1 that such joint deviation is not self-enforcing because,
holding country ks announcement xed at k = fi; jg, each member of the deviating
23An alternative approach would be to use the notion of a strong Nash equilibrium (SNE). However,
the use of CPNE is more appealing since the denition of a SNE requires that the equilibrium strategies
be immune to any joint deviations, even those that are not self-enforcing (i.e. are susceptible to further
deviations on the part of a proper subset of the deviating coalition).
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coalition (comprised of countries i and j) has an incentive to further deviate by altering
its announcement to also name country k. To see why this is the case, suppose country
i further alters its announcement from fj; g to fj; kg given that country j announces
fi; g and country ks announcement is xed at fi; jg. This further deviation on the
part of country i is payo¤-improving because it leads to the hub and spoke arrangement
hihi under which it is better o¤ relative to free trade (because of its status as the hub
country). Since this further deviation of country i from announcing fj; g to fj,kg is
credible, the original joint deviation (J1) is not self-enforcing.
Now consider the joint deviation (J2). Countries prefer free trade to no agreement
when their valuation of national welfare relative to political contributions is high enough:
gi(F   )  0 i¤   (F   )i (15)
Thus (J2) occurs when  > (F   )i holds. Note also that (ij   )i > (F   )i
holds and thus (J2) is self-enforcing only when   (ij )i. Given that (ij )i >
(F   jk)i, the range over which the strategy prole leading to free trade hF i is CPNE
is determined by the unilateral deviation of country i from announcement of fj; kg to
f; g that leads to a deviation from hF i to hjki. As a result, free trade is a CPNE
when   (F   jk)i holds.24
Next, we consider whether the Nash equilibrium announcement prole leading to
a bilateral FTA hiji is a CPNE. To this end, we examine three possible coalitional
announcement deviations: deviation of countries i, j and k from their respective an-
nouncements fj; g, fi; g and f; g to the announcements fj; kg, fi; kg and fi; jg,
leading to a deviation from hiji to hF i (JB1); deviation of countries i and k from their
respective announcements fj; g and f; g to fj; kg and fi; g, holding country js
announcement xed at j = ffi; gg, leading to a deviation from hiji to hihi (JB2);
and deviation of countries i, j and k from their respective announcements fj; g, fi; g,
and f; g to f; kg, f; kg, fi; jg, leading to a deviation from hiji to hkhi (JB3).
It is immediate from Lemma 1(iv) and (14) that JB1 happens when  < (F   jk)i
and it is a self-enforcing deviation since hF i is a strong Nash equilibrium over this range.
We know from Lemma 1(i) that JB2 never occurs since country k has no incentive to
deviate from its announcement f; g to fi; g, leading to a deviation hiji to hihi (joint
with the deviation of country i from its announcement fj; g to fj; kg). Similarly,
Lemma 1(i) implies that even when JB3 happens, it is not self enforcing since either
country i or country j has a unilateral incentive to break up their FTA with the hub
country. This discussion with the above Nash condition informs us that a bilateral FTA
is a CPNE when (ij   )i    (F   jk)i.
24 In fact, free trade is also a strong Nash equilibrium when   (F   jk)i since there exist no
unilateral or coalitional deviation from free trade.
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Finally consider no agreement hi. We know from Lemma1(ii) that the joint de-
viation of countries i and j from their respective announcements f; g and f; g to
fj; g and fi; g, leading to a deviation from hi to hiji, happens when  < (ij  )i
and it is self enforcing. We show in Appendix A that when   (ij  )i holds, there
exists no other coalitional deviation from the Nash equilibrium strategy prole leading
to No Agreement hi, and thus hi is stable.
Proposition 1: Given symmetry, (ij   )i > (F   jk)i holds and the following
results obtain under bilateralism:
(i) free trade hF i is the unique CPNE when  < (F   jk)i;
(ii) bilateral FTAs hiji are CPNE when (ij   )i    (F   jk)i and
(iii) No Agreement hi is the unique CPNE when  > (ij   )i.
The above proposition informs us that even when countries have completely symmet-
ric political preferences, multilateral free trade fails to be a CPNE when governments
valuation of producer surplus is high relative to other welfare components. This result
points to the importance of political economy factors even under symmetry and it devi-
ates from Saggi and Yildiz (2010) who argue in an endowment model that bilateralism
leads to global free trade when countries are completely symmetric with respect to their
endowment levels. It is worth noting that when the degree of political motivation is
su¢ ciently low, the above result implies that free trade is a unique stable agreement
under bilateralism. This result is similar to Goyal and Joshi (2006) who also employ
an oligopoly model of trade but assume  = 0. As we shall see below, by comparing
equilibria obtained under bilateralism and multilateralism, we provide an alternative
interpretation of this result relative to Goyal and Joshi (2006).
4 Endogenous agreements under multilateralism
In this section we analyze equilibrium trade policy formation under a scenario when
countries cannot pursue preferential trade liberalization and can only reduce tari¤s
multilaterally on an MFN basis. We refer to this scenario as multilateralism. Com-
parison of the equilibria that arise under bilateralism and multilateralism would reveal
whether the freedom to pursue FTAs, incorporated in the GATT Article XXIV, results
in deeper trade liberalization or not.
Under a multilateral approach to trade liberalization, the strategy set of country i
is 
i = f;Mg. In other words, each country can announce either in favor of or against
multilateral tari¤ reductions. If all three countries announce in favor, they choose to
set optimal tari¤s in order to maximize joint welfare. Such tari¤ is equal to zero in our
model. If only a pair of countries i and j announce in favor of multilateralism, they
choose optimal tari¤s in order to maximize their joint welfare subject to the constraint
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that they cannot discriminate against country k  i.e. in accordance with the MFN
clause of the WTO, the tari¤s that they impose on each other must be equal to their
respective tari¤s on country k. Formally, countries i and j sign the multilateral agree-
ment hijmi when individual country announcements are as follows: i = M , j = M ,
k = . Finally, we should note that if two (or more) countries announce against mul-
tilateralism, No Agreement hi prevails under which each country imposes its optimal
MFN tari¤ on every other country.
Saggi and Yildiz (2011) use an alternative model for the multilateralism game where
two countries are not permitted to undertake trade liberalization on an MFN basis and
a multilateral agreement could only arise if all three countries participated in it. This
unanimityview of multilateralism surely captures some aspects of the WTO but we
think that our model is more general and captures multilateral trade liberalization more
accurately. More specically, following Saggi and Yildiz (2010), our model assumes that
if two countries announce in favor of multilateralism and the third one announces against
it, then the two that are in favor can lower their tari¤s on each other as long as they
extend the tari¤ reductions to the third country. In other words, the model allows
two countries to liberalize trade on an MFN basis without needing the third countrys
consent. It is important to note that modeling multilateralism in this way also allows
us to compare the degree of trade liberalization under multilateralism and bilateralism,
something that could not be addressed under the "all or nothing" formulation used in
Saggi and Yildiz (2011).
4.1 Optimal tari¤s
As indicated above, when countries i and j agree to sign a multilateral agreement hijmi
they jointly choose tari¤s (tmi , t
m
j ) to solve
[ti(ij
m); tj(ij
m)]  argmax [gi(ijm) + gj(ijm)] (16)
which leads to the following optimal MFN tari¤s:
tmz =
(2z + 1)(  c)
2(3  2z)
, z = i; j (17)
First we nd that, similar to tz(ij) under hiji, tz(ijm) also increases in the degree of
political motivation: @tz(ij
m)
@z
> 0. Note also that countries that sign the multilateral
agreement hijmi lower their tari¤s on each other as well as on the non-participating
country (i.e. k) relative to the No Agreement hi:
tz()  tz(ijm) = 2(1  2z)(  c)
(3  2z)(5  2z)
> 0, z = i; j (18)
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The inequality tz(ijm) < tz() captures the free-riding problem inherent to multilateral
trade liberalization when it does not involve all three countries under hijmi country k
benets from the multilateral trade liberalization undertaken by the other two countries
without having to o¤er any liberalization in return since it retains its optimal Nash tari¤
tk() on countries i and j.
Furthermore, country k faces lower tari¤s in export markets when the other two
countries implement a preferential rather than a multilateral agreement, i.e., tz(ij) <
tz(ij
m), z = i; j. In other words, the degree of trade liberalization undertaken by two
countries is lower when they sign a multilateral agreement hijmi relative to the one when
they sign an FTA hiji: tz()   tz(ijm) < tz()   tz(ij), z = i; j. Note also that the
di¤erence between tz(ij) and tz(ijm) widens as the countries becomes more politically
motivated:@[tz(ij
m) tz(ij)]
@z
> 0.
From a non-member countrys perspective (i.e. country k), the relative e¤ect of a
preferential and a multilateral agreements between i and j on country ks welfare is
explained by two distinct e¤ects. First, there is a tari¤ level e¤ect, whereby country
k faces di¤erent tari¤ levels under FTA and multilateral agreement between i and j.
Since country k faces lower tari¤ under hiji relative to hijmi, tari¤ level e¤ect is stronger
under bilateralism. Second, while the non-member country faces symmetric treatment
under hijmi, there is a discrimination e¤ect stemming from the fact that the non-
member country is subject to a discriminatory treatment in each member countrys
market under the bilateral FTA hiji: while countries i and j face zero tari¤s in each
others market under hiji, country k faces the tari¤ tz(ij), z = i; j. Since there is
no discrimination under hijmi, discrimination e¤ect implies additional welfare loss for
country k under bilateralism. It turns out that the welfare (and the governments
payo¤) of the non-member country (k) is lower under hiji compared to hijmi when 
is su¢ ciently low:
gk(ij)  gk(ijm) when z  (ij   ijm)k, z = i; j (19)
When governments i and j have low political biases (i and j are su¢ ciently low),
tz(ij) and tz(ijm) are relatively close and tari¤complementarity e¤ect is relatively small.
Thus, under such a case, the discrimination e¤ect under bilateralism dominates the tari¤
level e¤ect under multilateralism and the non-member country prefers hijmi to hiji. As
i and j rise, the tari¤ complementarity deepens and the di¤erence between tz(ij)
and tz(ijm) rises. Therefore, the tari¤ level e¤ect becomes more pronounced relative to
the discrimination e¤ect so that the optimal strategy of the non-member country gets
reversed. As we demonstrate below, this fundamental di¤erence between preferential
and multilateral trade liberalization plays a crucial role in our analysis.
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4.2 Equilibrium analysis under symmetry
In this section, we derive the set of CPNE of the multilateralism game for the case
of complete symmetry in the political economy preferences between countries: i =
 for all i. As under bilateralism, the status quo hi is a Nash equilibrium under
multilateralism. In order to check whether the announcement prole leading to hijmi is
also a Nash equilibrium, we need to consider two unilateral deviations: (U1) - unilateral
deviation of country i from its announcement of fMg to the announcement fg that
leads to a deviation from hijmi to hi; (U2) - unilateral deviation of country k from its
announcement of fg to the announcement fMg that leads to a deviation from hijmi
to hF i
It is easy to show that a member country has no incentive to break the multilateral
agreement hijmi:
gi(ij
m   ) = gj(ijm   )  0 for all  (20)
while the outsider country (k) benets from joining the agreement hijmi, thereby con-
verting it to hF i, only when the degree of political bias is su¢ ciently low:
gk(F   ijm) > 0 i¤  < (F   ijm)k (21)
Thus, under symmetry the announcement prole leading to the multilateral agreement
hijmi is a Nash equilibrium if   (F   ijm)k holds. This result is interesting because
it says that when  is su¢ ciently large, the free rider benets from the multilateral
trade liberalization undertaken by other countries are large enough for country k to
make it opt out of hF i and thereby prevent global free trade from emerging. The
only remaining question is whether the announcement prole leading to free trade hF i
is a Nash equilibrium. The answer is in the a¢ rmative: the only possible unilateral
deviation that can occur from free trade is the unilateral deviation of country k from
its announcement of fMg to the announcement fg that leads to a deviation from
hF i to hijmi. We know from (21) that this deviation occurs when  > (F   ijm)k.
Thus, the announcement prole leading to free trade hF i is a Nash equilibrium when
  (F   ijm)k.
Note that, as before, multiple Nash equilibria arise in the multilateralism game the
key di¤erence being that, by denition, a bilateral FTA is infeasible under the multilat-
eralism game. We next isolate CPNE under the two approaches to trade liberalization.
It is clear from (20) that the No Agreement hi fails to be a CPNE since any two
countries have incentives to jointly deviate from their announcements of no agreement
to announcements of multilateralism that leads to a deviation from hi to hijmi and it
is a self-enforcing deviation. We thus have
Proposition 2: Given symmetry, the following holds under multilateralism:
19
(i) free trade hF i is the unique CPNE when  < (F   ijm)k and
(ii) a multilateral agreement hijmi is the unique CPNE when   (F   ijm)k.25
4.2.1 Comparison of stable agreements under bilateralism and multilater-
alism
A comparison of Propositions 1 and 2 allows us to assess the role of GATT Article XXIV
on the world trading system and leads to our main result under symmetry, depicted in
Figure 1:
Proposition 3: Given symmetry, (ij )i > (F   ijm)k > (F   ij)k holds and
the following results obtain:
(i) (Irrelevance of Bilateralism) when  < (F   ij)k holds, hF i is the the unique
CPNE under both bilateralism and multilateralism.
(ii) (Strong Stumbling Block) when (F   ij)k <  < (F   ijm)k holds, the unique
CPNE under multilateralism is hF i whereas under bilateralism it is hiji;
(iii) (Partial Building Block) when (F   ijm)k <  < (ij )i the unique CPNE
under multilateralism is hijmi whereas under bilateralism it is hiji and
(iv) (Partial Stumbling Block) when  > (ij   )i holds, the unique CPNE under
multilateralism is hijmi whereas under bilateralism it is hi.
Figure 1 
The rst part of the above proposition implies that when countries are completely
symmetric, the freedom to pursue bilateral FTAs does not matter only when  is su¢ -
ciently low. Therefore, when governments have low political bias, nothing would be lost
by forsaking the freedom to pursue FTAs since such agreements would not even arise
in equilibrium. However, it follows from the second part of the proposition that when
 is at the intermediate range, the ability to form FTAs reduces the likelihood of global
free trade arising as a CPNE. When such is the case, we argue that FTAs act as strong
stumbling blocs for multilateral free trade. The intuition for this result can be explained
as follows. First note that when (F   ij)k <  < (F   ijm)k holds, it is immedi-
ate from (19) that  > (ij   ijm)k obtains and the level e¤ect under multilateralism
dominates the discrimination e¤ect under bilateralism.26 Therefore, country k has an
incentive to free ride on the trade liberalization by countries i and j under bilateralism
by deviating unilaterally from hF i to hiji, while such incentive does not exist under
multilateralism.
When the global free trade fails to obtain under both bilateralism and multilateral-
ism, the third part of the proposition argues that for (F   ijm)k <  < (ij   )i,
25 In fact, we can show that under symmetry hF i and hijmi are the strong Nash equilibrium over the
given parametre ranges.
26Note that under symmetry z(ij   ijm)k = (ij   ijm)k, z = i; j.
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the ability to form bilateral FTAs can improve global welfare since the degree of trade
liberalization undertaken by two countries is lower when they sign a multilateral agree-
ment hijmi relative to the case when they sign a bilateral FTA hiji. In such a case,
we argue that FTAs act as partial building blocs. Finally, when  is su¢ ciently large
(i.e. tari¤s are close to prohibitive), the ability to form FTAs reduces the world welfare
(FTAs act as partial stumbling blocs) because partial multilateral trade liberalization is
always better than no trade liberalization under bilateralism.
Given these results under symmetry, it is natural to ask: does the freedom to pursue
bilateral FTAs ever help to achieve global free trade? We next show that such possibility
arises when we introduce asymmetry in political preferences between countries.
5 Equilibrium analysis under asymmetry
Hereafter, we drop the assumption that countries have symmetric political preferences.
Before proceeding with the equilibrium analysis of trade policies, we rst investigate
how individual countrys incentives to form a bilateral FTA depend on the degree of
asymmetry in political preferences across countries. We address this key question by
breaking it up into parts and stating two related lemmas.
Lemma 2: Let the initial regime be denoted by v and countries i and j form an
FTA that leads to regime r. Then, for any initial regime v, the following holds:
(i) @gi(r v)@i < 0; (ii)
@gi(r v)
@j
> 0 and (iii) @gi(r v)@k = 0
Joining an FTA involves a trade-o¤ for member countries. On one hand, an FTA is
costly for member countries because their domestic surpluses are lowered under regime
r relative to the regime v. Part (i) of Lemma 2 states that the reduction in domestic
surplus, implied by an FTA, is increasing in the degree of a countrys own political
bias. On the other hand, being part of an FTA increases export prots of members in
each others markets, which is increasing in the external tari¤ and thus in the degree
of political bias in the partner country (part (ii) of Lemma 2). The third part simply
follows from the market segmentation: export prot of countries i and j in country k
are the same under both regimes r and v.
Next, we consider the e¤ect of an FTA between countries i and j on the government
ks payo¤.
Lemma 3: Let the initial regime be denoted by v. If countries i and j form an
FTA that leads to regime r, then the following holds for any initial regime v:
(i) @gk(r v)@z < 0 when z is an FTA partner of country k in both regimes r and v,
z = i; j.
(ii) @gk(r v)@z  0 if and only if z   when z is not an FTA partner of country k
in regimes r and v, z = i; j.
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(iii) @gk(r v)@k = 0
To see the intuition behind the rst part of the above lemma, consider the case when
the status-quo regime v is hiki and i and j forms an FTA so that the new regime r is
hihi. Under hiki, country ks rm enjoys a strategic advantage against country js rm
in country is market. This strategic advantage gets larger as i increases since country
js rm faces higher tari¤s in country is market. With an additional FTA between
countries i and j under hihi (regime r), this strategic advantage in country is market
disappears. Thus, the rst part of the lemma obtains.27 To see the intuition for the
second part, consider the case when the status-quo regime v is hjki and i and j forms an
FTA so that the new regime r is hjhi. Note that country k faces a lower tari¤ in country
is market under hjhi relative to the one under hjki due to the tari¤ complementarity
e¤ect. We know that the tari¤ complementarity e¤ect (tari¤ level e¤ect) rises in i:
@[ti() ti(ij)]
@i
> 0. However, under hjhi, lower tari¤ comes in a discriminatory way since
country j faces zero tari¤ in country is market while country k faces a positive one
(negative discrimination e¤ect), and the discrimination e¤ect rises in i:
@ti(ij)
@i
> 0. As
a result, relative importance of the two e¤ects determines how gk(jh  jk) changes with
i. While the tari¤ level e¤ect dominates the discrimination e¤ect when i is su¢ ciently
low (i  ), it gets reversed when the degree of political motivation is su¢ ciently high
(i > ).
28 Finally, as in Lemma 2, part (iii) of Lemma 3 follows directly from the
market segmentation assumption.
It is important to note that gi(ih) > gi(F ) holds not only under symmetry but
also when countries have asymmetric political biases. First note that the hub country
i enjoys privileged access in both foreign countries under hihi neither spoke country
imposes a tari¤ on the hub country whereas both impose external tari¤s on each other.
As a result of this favorable treatment, country is export surplus under hihi exceeds that
under hF i. Second, country is domestic surplus under hihi is the same as that under
hF i. Thus, country i is strictly better o¤ under hihi relative to hF i. Note from part
(i) of Lemma 3 that the positive e¤ect of the privileged access gets larger as the spoke
countries are more politically motivated and have more protected domestic markets.
Finally, we examine how the incentives of countries to form (or to join) a multilat-
eral agreement depend on the degree of asymmetry in the political preference across
countries.
Lemma 4: Under multilateralism, the following holds:
(i) @gi(ij
m )
@i
 0 while @gi(ijm )@j  0 and
@gi(ij
m )
@k
= 0;
(ii) @gi(F ij
m)
@i
< 0 while @gi(F ij
m)
@j
 0 and @gi(F ijm)@k  0
27The same intuition and result obtain when the status-quo regime v is hkhi and i and j forms an
FTA so that the new regime r is hF i.
28The same intuition and result obtain when the status-quo regime v is hi and i and j forms an
FTA so that the new regime r is hiji.
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The intuition behind the results reported in Lemma 4 is analogous to that obtained
for bilateralism in Lemmas 2 and 3 with one exception: whereas @gi(ij )@i < 0 and
@gi(ij )
@j
> 0 hold under bilateralism, the opposite is true under multilateralism, i.e.,
@gi(ij
m )
@i
> 0 and @gi(ij
m )
@j
< 0. To see why this is the case, recall that under the
multilateral agreement hijim, countries i and j impose jointly chosen MFN tari¤s not
only on country k but also on each other, while under the bilateral agreement hiji they
lower the internal tari¤s to zero. Since country is ability to protect its own market
rises in i while the export surplus gain in country js market falls in j , the above
di¤erence arises.
5.1 Equilibrium agreements under bilateralism
Let the pattern of asymmetry in political motivations to be given by: b = c =  
a  12 .29 Thus, country a is more concerned about producer surplus than countries
c and b. Also, let a(r   v)i denote the critical threshold for country as political bias
parameter at which government i is indi¤erent between regimes r and v. To avoid
redundancy, we skip the discussion of Nash equilibrium and focus directly on CPNE
agreements under bilateralism. Before proceeding, it is useful to establish the following
result that generalizes Lemma 1 from the perspective of countries with lower political
biases:
Lemma 5: When b = c =   a  12 holds, gi(ih) > maxfgi(F ), gi(jh), gi(ij),
gi(jk), gi()g for all i; j = b; c.
The above lemma is a direct implication of the combination of Lemmas 1, 2, and
3, and implies that, in comparison to all other trade agreements, countries with lower
political biases obtain the highest welfare as being the hub under the hub and spoke
agreement hihi. Note that Lemma 5 does not apply to the country with the largest
political bias since it has stronger incentive to break its FTA link(s).30
The following proposition summarizes which trade regimes can arise in the equilib-
rium under bilateralism and asymmetry in political preferences between countries.
Proposition 4: Suppose b = c =   a  12 . Then, the following holds under
bilateralism:
(i) free trade hF i is the unique CPNE when a < a(F   bc)a;
29 In Appendix B, we show that all results obtained in this section remain qualitatively the same under
an alternative pattern of asymmetry when two countries have stronger political biases than the third
one: a  b = c =   12 :
30Since countries b and c are identical, the same payo¤ obtains for country a under habi and haci
(and under hbhi and hchi). Similarly, country bs payo¤ under habi and hbhi is the same as country
cs payo¤ under haci and hchi, respectively. From heron, for notational simplicity, we opt for using
habi to represent a bilateral FTA between the country with the largest political bias and the one with
lower political bias and hbhi to represent hub and spoke regime where the hub country has a lower
political bias. In a similar way, under multilateralism game, habmi represents a two-country multilateral
agreement between the country with the largest political bias and the one with lower political bias.
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(ii) any bilateral FTA is a CPNE when minfa(ah   ab)c; a(ab   )ag  a 
a(F   bc)a;
(iii) bilateral FTA hbci is the unique CPNE when (a) a > a(F   bc)a and (b)
a > minfa(ah  ab)c; a(ab  )agg and (c)  < (bc  )b holds and
(iv) no agreement hi is the unique CPNE when  > (bc  )b.
Figure 2 
Proposition 4 relates the degree of underlying asymmetry in political preferences to
the nature of agreements that are CPNE and is illustrated in Figure 2. Part (i) states
that if both the degree of political preferences of countries and the degree of asymmetry
in political preferences are su¢ ciently small, free trade is a unique CPNE. Recall that,
under symmetric political preferences, the range of  for which free trade hF i obtains
as a CPNE is determined by the unilateral deviation of country i from announcement
of fj; kg to f; g, which leads to a deviation from hF i to hjki. Under asymmetry, it is
immediate from Lemma 2 that the stability of global free trade depends critically upon
the unilateral deviation of the country with the strongest political bias (i.e. country
a) from announcement fb; cg to f; g that leads to a deviation from hF i to hbci, and
thus free trade hF i is a CPNE when a  a(F   bc)a. Therefore, for free trade to
be a CPNE, complete symmetry is not a necessary condition. As long as the degree of
asymmetry in political preferences is su¢ ciently small, free trade is still a CPNE.
Part (ii) says that if the degree of asymmetry in political preferences is moderate, all
bilateral trade agreements, including the country with the strongest political preference
as a member, are CPNE. As the degree of political asymmetry rises, country a opts for
not being a member of any FTA and a bilateral FTA between the other two countries
is a unique CPNE. Finally part (iv) says that if the political preferences are strong, no
agreement hi is a unique CPNE. It is noteworthy that multiple CPNE obtain when
the degree of political preferences and political asymmetry are moderate  i.e. when
minfa(ah   ab)c; a(ab   )ag  a  a(F   bc)a. The theory o¤ers no guidance
about which of these equilibria might be observed.
To see how the Article XXIV of the GATT matters for the world trade system, we
next consider a scenario where countries were to follow only a multilateral approach to
trade liberalization.
5.2 Equilibrium agreements under multilateralism
Before we identify agreements that are CPNE under a purely multilateral approach,
it is important to note that, unlike in the bilateralism game, No Agreement hi never
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arises as a CPNE. It follows from the inequality (20) and Lemma 4 that countries b
and c have incentives to jointly deviate from their announcements of no agreement to
announcements of multilateralism, and this deviation from hi to hbcmi is self enforcing.
In Proposition 5 we show that CPNE trade agreements under multilateralism depend
on the strength of political preferences and the degree of asymmetry.
Proposition 5: Suppose b = c =   a  12 . Then, the following holds under
multilateralism:
(i) free trade hF i is the unique CPNE when a < a(F   bcm)a;
(ii) any two-country multilateral agreement is a CPNE when a  minfa(abm  
)b; a(F   abm)cg and
(iii) multilateral agreement hbcmi is the unique CPNE when (a) a > a(F   bcm)a
and (b) a > minfa(abm   )b; a(F   abm)cg hold.
Figure 3 
Figure 3 illustrates Proposition 5 and shows which trade agreements are CPNE under
multilateralism. The rst part of the proposition states that when both the degree of
political preferences of countries and the degree of asymmetry in political preferences
are su¢ ciently small, free trade is the unique CPNE. Similar to our analysis under the
bilateralism game, the unilateral deviation of country a from its announcement of fMg
to the announcement fg (leading to a deviation from hF i to hbcmi) determines the
range over which hF i is a CPNE. Thus, free trade hF i is a CPNE of the multilateralism
game when a  a(F   bcm)a. If this condition fails, the benets of a free rider a from
the multilateral trade liberalization undertaken by other countries are large enough for
country a to opt out of free trade hF i. In fact, free trade hF i is the strong Nash
equilibrium when a < a(F   bcm)a holds.
Proposition 5(ii) informs us that if countries have su¢ cient political preference and
the degree of asymmetry in political preferences is moderate, all MFN-based trade
agreement between any pair of countries are CPNE. As the degree of political preferences
and political asymmetry rise, country a opts for not being a part of any MFN-based
agreement and thus hbcmi arises as a unique CPNE.
5.3 Does the ability to form bilateral FTAs matter?
We know from Propositions 4 and 5 that the global free trade is a CPNE under the
bilateralism game for a  (F   bc)a and it is a CPNE under multilateralism for
a  a(F   bcm)a. A comparison of these critical threshold for political preferences
leads to the following result:
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Proposition 6: Suppose b = c =   a  12 . Then, the following obtains:
(i) (Irrelevance of Bilateralism) when a < minfa(F   bcm)a; a(F   bc)ag holds,
hF i is a unique CPNE under both bilateralism and multilateralism.
(ii) (Strong Building Block) when a(F   bcm)a < a < a(F   bc)a holds, a unique
CPNE is hF i under bilateralism and hbcmi under multilateralism;
(iii) (Strong Stumbling Block) when a(F   bc)a < a < a(F   bcm)a holds, a
unique CPNE under multilateralism is hF i whereas under bilateralism hiji is a CPNE,
8i; j;
Figure 4 
Proposition 6 is the main result of this paper and is illustrated in Figure 4. It
emphasizes the important role of asymmetry in political preferences between countries
for the e¤ect of the GATT Article XXIV on the global trade system. The rst part
of the above proposition implies that when both the degree of political preferences of
countries and the degree of asymmetry in political preferences are su¢ ciently small,
bilateralism is irrelevant for the ultimate objective of achieving global free trade. It is
important to emphasize that whether free trade is a CPNE or not depends critically on
the unilateral deviation incentive of the country with the strongest political preference
(country a). Therefore, the comparison of welfare of country a under hbcmi and hbci is
the key for the next two parts of the proposition. As discussed above, this comparison
depends on the relative strengths of the tari¤ level e¤ect under multilateralism and
the discrimination e¤ect under bilateralism. Recall that while country a faces higher
tari¤ under hbcmi than under hbci, it is discriminated against its rival exporter in each
member countrys market under the bilateral FTA hbci but not under hbcmi.
The second part of the proposition informs us that, unlike in the symmetric case,
Article XXIV can be necessary for achieving global free trade when the asymmetry in
political preferences is su¢ ciently large and the political preferences of countries b and
c are not too strong. This result stems from the fact that since political preferences of
countries b and c are not too strong, country a faces lower MFN tari¤s under hbcmi and,
despite the tari¤ complementarity e¤ect under hbci, the discrimination e¤ect dominates
the tari¤ level e¤ect. Thus, country a has less incentive to unilaterally deviate from
its free trade announcement under bilateralism relative to multilateralism. As a result,
when the asymmetry in political preferences is su¢ ciently large and the political pref-
erences of countries b and c are not too strong, the threat of a bilateral FTA between
countries b and c and the discrimination that is inherent to such trade agreement can
be necessary to convince country a to announce in favor of the global free trade. When
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such is the case, Article XXIV acts as a strong building bloc for achieving the global
free trade.
Part (iii) of Proposition 6 provides the opposite argument to the second part: when
countries are relatively symmetric in their political preferences which are moderately
strong (or as we converge to the complete symmetry as in Proposition 3), the tari¤ level
e¤ect dominates the discrimination e¤ect and the degree of positive externality enjoyed
by country a is stronger under the multilateral agreement hbcmi relative to the bilateral
FTA hbci. Therefore, the incentives for participating in global free trade are stronger
when discriminatory bilateral agreements are not permitted. In this case the Article
XXIV acts as a strong stumbling bloc for the global free trade.
From the above discussion, we know that when a > maxfa(F   bcm)a; a(F  
bc)ag, global free trade fails to obtain under both bilateralism and multilateralism.
Intuitively, when the the degree of political asymmetry is su¢ ciently large, then even
the possibility of a bilateral FTA between the countries with weaker political preference
is not enough to induce country a to opt for global free trade. In such case, it is
informative to compare global welfare from the equilibrium agreements that obtain
under bilateralism and multilateralism. From Propositions 4 and 5 we know that when
maxfa(F   bcm)a; a(F   bc)ag  a and   (bc  )b hold, bilateral FTAs obtain
in the equilibrium under bilateralism and an MA obtains under multilateralism. Since
the degree of trade liberalization is larger under bilateral FTAs relative to two-country
MFN-based agreements, global welfare is greater under the bilateralism game than in
the multilateralism game. Thus, when free trade is out of reach, the option to pursue
bilateral FTAs can yield welfare-improving trade liberalization that is foregone under a
strictly multilateral approach. In this case Article XXIV acts as a partial building bloc.
On the other hand, when  > (bc   )b holds, while two country MFN-based
agreements arise in CPNE under the multilateralism game, No Agreement hi is a
unique CPNE under the bilateralism game. Since partial trade liberalization is always
better than no trade liberalization, we obtain higher welfare when countries follow only
a multilateral approach to trade liberalization. Under this scenario, the existence of
Article XXIV leads to a partial stumbling bloc.
6 Conclusions
During a period when multilateral trade liberalization seems to have come to a grind-
ing halt, the question whether PTAs have a facilitating role to play in the multilateral
trading system becomes even more important. PTAs appear to be the only type of
reciprocal trade liberalization countries are interested in undertaking nowadays. While
member countries reciprocally reduce internal tari¤s on each other under preferential
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trade liberalization, discriminatory treatment toward non-members is inherent to such
trade agreements. As a result, the concerns that the pursuit of PTAs might undermine
multilateral trade liberalization e¤orts remain. This paper provides a political economy
analysis of countriesdecisions to pursue preferential and multilateral trade liberaliza-
tion, and analyzes the role of the GATT article XXIV, which sanctions PTAs as an
exception to non-discrimination principle, for the prospects of global free trade. We
develop a model with endogenous formation of trade agreements, both preferential and
multilateral, where governments choose their trade policies optimally under any trade
regime. In contrast with previous studies, we allow policymakers to have political mo-
tivations so that they value industry interests potentially more than social welfare. In
line with the existing empirical evidence, we also allow for political preferences to vary
across countries. By comparing equilibrium outcomes under bilateralism and multilat-
eralism, we identify the e¤ect of political forces and GATT article XXIV on the global
trade system and on the likelihood of achieving the global free trade.
Our analysis reveals that the pressure applied by industrial interest groups and het-
erogeneity in preferences of policymakers across countries play an important role in
judging the success of bilateralism and multilateralism. We show that when political
motivations are not extreme (neither too strong nor too weak) and the variation in
political preferences across countries is low, a bilateral FTA emerges as a unique equi-
librium outcome, whereas global free trade would have prevail had preferential trade
liberalization not been available. This strong stumbling block e¤ect of FTAs owes to
substantial reduction in tari¤s by FTA member countries that motivates other countries
to stay out of the agreement and free ride on trade liberalization e¤ort by FTA members.
However, with heterogeneous political preferences, the freedom to pursue preferential
agreement may become a necessary condition for global free trade so that FTAs act as
a strong building block to multilateral liberalization. This would be the case when the
political-economy motives for protection are not too strong so that the external tari¤s of
countries forming a bilateral or a multilateral agreement are not substantially di¤erent.
Then a third country would choose to join the FTA in order to avoid tari¤ discrimina-
tion within the agreement, as long as the political bias of a third country is not too large
for it to opt out of the agreement entirely. Therefore, the threat of preferential trade
liberalization and discrimination inherent to such trade liberalization may be necessary
to induce countries with stronger special interest groups to participate in multilateral
free trade negotiations.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Here we report the key formulae that are necessary for proving our results. For an
arbitrary tari¤ vector t = (tij ; tik; tji; tjk; tki; tkj), we can write country is government
payo¤ as
gi = CSi+(1+i)ii +
X
z=j;k
iz + TRi;
where consumer surplus in country i equals
CSi =
1
2

3(  c)  tij   tik
4
2
while domestic and foreign export prots are
ii =

(  c) + tij + tik
4
2
X
z=j;k
iz =

(  c)  3tji + tjk
4
2
+

(  c)  3tki + tkj
4
2
and the tari¤ revenue is given by
TRi =
tij [(  c)  3tij + tik] + tik[(  c)  3tik + tij ]
4
Using the above formulae and the optimal tari¤ levels reported in the text, we can easily
calculate government payo¤s under all possible trade agreements. Note that, under a
multilateral free trade, we replace i = 0, leading to the equivalence of the governments
payo¤ and national welfare. To save space, we do not include the algebraic details
underlying these straightforward calculations but they are available upon request.
Proof of Lemma 1
Assuming i =   12 , the following obtains:
Part (i): Using the above welfare components and optimal tari¤s under the given
trade regimes, when i =   12 holds, the following obtains for all : gi(ih F ) > 0;
gi(ih   jh) > 0; gi(ih   ij) > 0; gi(ih   jk) > 0 and gi(ih   ) > 0 while
gk(ih  ij) < 0.
Part (ii) gi(ij   ) = gj(ij   )  0 i¤   (ij   )i = 0:423;
Part (iii) gj(F   ih) = gk(F   ih)  0 i¤   (F   ih)j = 0:447 and
Part (iv) gi(F   jk)  0 i¤   (F   jk)i = 0:214
Inequality 13: gk(ij   ) = ( c)
2(51 76+122)
2(21 2)2(5 2)2 > 0 for all   12 .
Inequality 14: gi(F   ij)  0 i¤   (F   ij)i = 0:274.
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Inequality 15: gi(F   )  0 i¤   (F   )i = 0:356.
Proof of Proposition 1
First note from the proof of Lemma 1 that (ij )i = 0:423 > (F   jk)i = 0:214.
Given that   (ij   )i = 0:423, we know from inequality (15) that there exists
no deviation from No Agreement hi to free trade. Finally, gj(ih   )  0 i¤  
(F   ij)i = 0:3 and thus when   (ij   )i = 0:423, there exists no deviation from
No Agreement hi to any hub and spoke regime.
Inequality 19: gk(ij)  gk(ijm) when   (ij   ijm)k = 0:146
Inequality 20: gi(ijm   ) = gj(ijm   ) = ( c)
2(1 2)2
2(3 2)(5 2)2  0 for all   12 .
Inequality 21: gk(F   ijm) > 0 i¤  < (F   ijm)k = 0:303
Proof of Proposition 3
It is immediate from the proof of Lemma 1 and inequality 21 that (ij   )i =
0:423 > (F   ijm)k = 0:303 > (F   ij)k = 0:214. The rest of the proposition is
immediate from Propositions 1 and 2.
Proof of Lemma 2: Given that i; j  12 holds, using the above welfare compo-
nents and optimal tari¤s under the given trade regimes, the following obtains:
@gi(ij   )
@i
=
@gi(jh  jk)
@i
< 0,
@gi(ij   )
@j
=
@gi(ih  ik)
@j
> 0,
@gi(ih  ik)
@i
=
@gi(F   kh)
@i
< 0 and
@gi(jh  jk)
@j
=
@gi(F   kh)
@j
> 0
Proof of Lemma 3: Given that i; j  12 holds, using the above welfare compo-
nents and optimal tari¤s under the given trade regimes, the following obtains:
@gk(ih  ik)
@i
=
@gk(F   kh)
@i
< 0
and
@gk(ih  ik)
@j
=
@gk(ij   )
@i
> 0 i¤ j & 
and the critical  in part (ii) is found as  = 0:271.
Proof of Lemma 4: Given that i; j ; k  12 holds, using the above welfare
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components and optimal tari¤s under the given trade regimes, the following obtains:
@gi(ij
m   )
@i
 0, @gi(ij
m   )
@j
 0, @gi(F   ij
m)
@i
< 0,
@gi(F   ijm)
@j
 0 and @gi(F   ij
m)
@k
 0
Critical Political Biases and Proofs of Propositions 4, 5 and 6
Using the welfare levels reported above, we can easily nd the critical political
bias values that are also represented in the gures in the text. First we focus on
the CPNE condition for hF i and nd that country a has an incentive to unilaterally
deviate from its announcement fb; cg to f; g that leads to a deviation from hF i to hbci
when a > a(F   bc)a holds and it is a self enforcing deviation. Moreover, using the
welfare levels reported above, we can easily show that there exist no other unilateral or
coalitional announcement deviations from hF i and thus free trade hF i is a CPNE when
a  a(F   bc)a.
Next, we show that the joint deviation of countries b and c from their respective
announcements f; g and f; g to f; cg and f; bg, leading to a deviation from hi
to hbci, happens when  < (bc )b = 0:423 and it is self enforcing. Using the welfare
levels reported above, when   (bc   )b holds, there exists no other coalitional
deviations from the Nash equilibrium strategy prole leading to No Agreement hi,
and thus hi is a CPNE. Now consider whether bilateral FTAs that involve country a
(i.e. habi and haci) are CPNE. First note that coalitional announcement deviations from
habi (or haci) to hF i is self-enforcing only when a  a(F   bc)a. Second, country a
has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from its announcement fb; g (f; cg) to f; g
that leads to a deviation from habi (or haci) to hi when a < a(ab )a. Finally, the
coalitional announcement deviation of countries a and c from habi to hahi occurs when
a > a(ah  ab)c holds and it is a self-enforcing deviation.
Combining the above critical political biases, we obtain that habi and haci are CPNE
when minfa(ah   ab)c; a(ab   )ag  a  a(F   bc)a holds. We can also show
over the same range that hbci is a CPNE as well (while not unique). Finally, using
these critical political biases, we can show that there exists no unilateral and coalitional
deviation from hbci when (a) a > (F   bc)a and (b) a > minfa(ah  ab)c; a(ab 
)agg and (c) a < a(bc  )b and thus hbci is the unique CPNE.
Similarly, in the multilateralism game, country a has an incentive to unilaterally
deviate from its announcement of fMg to the announcement fg (leading to a deviation
from hF i to hbcmi) when a > a(F   bcm)a holds and there exist no other unilateral or
coalitional announcement deviations from hF i and thus free trade hF i is a CPNE when
a  a(F   bcm)a holds.
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Note from the inequality (20) and Lemma 4 that countries b and c have incentives
to jointly deviate from their announcements of no agreement to announcements of mul-
tilateralism and this deviation from hi to hbcmi is self-enforcing. Thus, No Agreement
hi never arises as a CPNE in the multilateralism game. Now consider whether two-
country multilateral agreement that involve country a (i.e. habmi and hacmi) are CPNE.
Focusing on habmi we have that country a has no incentive to unilaterally deviate while
country b has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from its announcement of multilater-
alism to no agreement when a > a(ab
m   )b. Moreover, when a > a(F   abm)c
holds, country c has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from its announcement of no
agreement to announcement of multilateralism leading to a deviation from habmi to hF i
and this deviation is self-enforcing.
Then, we argue that habmi and hacmi are CPNE when a  minfa(abm )b; a(F 
abm)cg holds. We can also show over the same range that hbcmi is a CPNE as well (while
not unique). Finally, using these critical political biases, we can show that there exists
no unilateral and coalitional deviation from hbcmi when (a) a > a(F   bcm)a and (b)
a > minfa(abm   )b; a(F   abm)cg hold and thus hbcmi is the unique CPNE.
The proof of Proposition 6 is immediate from the comparisons of Proposition 4 and
Proposition 5.
Appendix B: Alternative Pattern of Asymmetry
In the main text we modelled the cross-country di¤erences in political preferences in a
way that one country has stronger political bias than the other two. In this appendix
we show that the main result of the paper about strong building and strong stumbling
block e¤ects of FTAs survives for an alternative denition of asymmetry in political
preferences when majority of the countries have strong political biases. Specically,
here we assume that the pattern of asymmetry in political motivations is given by:
a  b = c =   12 . To avoid redundancy, we directly state our main result that is
a modied version of our Proposition 6, illustrated in Figure 5:
Proposition 7: Suppose a  b = c =   12 . Then, the following obtains:
(i) (Irrelevance of Bilateralism) when a > maxfa(F   abm)c; a(F   ab)cg holds,
hF i is a CPNE under both bilateralism and multilateralism.
(ii) (Strong Building Block) when a(F   ab)c < a < a(F   abm)c holds, hF i is a
CPNE is under bilateralism but not under multilateralism;
(iii) (Strong Stumbling Block) when a(F   abm)c < a < a(F   ab)c holds, hF i is
a CPNE is under multilateralism but not under bilateralism.
Figure 5 
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It is important to note from the comparison of Propositions 6 and 7 that, irrespective
of the nature of asymmetry in political preferences, similar results obtain regarding the
relative merits of bilateralism and multilateralism for achieving global free trade. As in
Proposition 6, the rst part of the above proposition implies that when both the degree
of political preferences of countries and the degree of asymmetry in political preferences
are su¢ ciently small, free trade arises as a CPNE under both regimes and thus the
freedom to pursue bilateral FTAs plays no potential role for the ultimate objective of
achieving global free trade.
Similar to our previous discussion in Proposition 6, whether free trade is a CPNE
or not depends critically on the unilateral deviation incentive of the countries with
stronger political preference (say country c). Therefore, we still focus on the comparison
of country cs government payo¤ under habmi and habi. As before, while country c faces
higher tari¤ under habmi than under habi, it is discriminated against its rival exporter in
each member countrys market under the bilateral FTA habi but not under habmi. Note
from the second part of the proposition that FTAs act as a strong building bloc when
the asymmetry in political preferences is su¢ ciently large and the political preference
of country a is not too strong. The intuition behind this result mimics our discussion in
Proposition 6: over this parameter range the discrimination e¤ect dominates the tari¤
level e¤ect and thus country c has less incentive to unilaterally deviate from its free
trade announcement under bilateralism relative to multilateralism.
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Figure 1: Bilateralism vs. Multilateralism under Symmetry  
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               Figure 2: CPNE Agreements under Bilateralism – Asymmetry 
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           Figure 3: CPNE Agreements under Multilateralism – Asymmetry 
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Figure 4: Bilateralism versus Multilateralism under Asymmetry 
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Figure 5: Bilateralism versus Multilateralism under alternative pattern of asymmetry 
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